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I. The Setting of the Problem 
Animals are used both as a source of 
energy for the production and transportation 
of agricultural products, and also as e1em-
selves a source of food and fiber. Many now 
question the justifiability at least of 
treating animals as themselves consumable 
prooucts. 
Specific practices of animal agriculture 
have come under fire, as well as the entire 
phenomenon of raising and managing animals in 
order to eat them or to wear their skin, fur, 
or fibers. Those who have attacked such 
dealings with nonhumans have employed strate-
gies designed to challenge one of two claims: 
either that nonhumans have no intrinsic 
e~cal significance, deserve no serious 
attention on their own merits, or else ~t 
humans are more important than other ani-
mals.[l] Defenders of humans have met these 
attacks head-on.[2] 
This discussion will be devoted mainly 
to these two issues: the intrinsic and reIa-
tive importance of human and nonhuman ani-
mals. I shall present a detailed defense of 
a view rather like the position taken by 
Kant, arguing ~t ethical standing is to be 
reserved for ethical agents, excluding nonhu-
mans and some humans. This leaves only a 
derivative irn}::.ortance for those who are not 
ethical agents. Later, I use these conclu-
sions to rrake clear the complexity in as-
sessments of particular animal agricultural 
practices and veganism. 
II. The Problem 
Editors' Note We are pleased to publish 
the contributions by Professors Susan isen 
and Charlie Blatz to the second Pacific Divi-
sion meeting of the American Society for 
Value Inquiry, which was held in San Francis-
co in March, 1985. 
trinsic importance of humans and other ani-
mals. What is the basis of ethical standing 
or of a being's deserving consideration in 
itself? First, let us get straight on the 
question. William K. Frankena raises a re-
lated, issue in an instructive way: 
The point is ~t, in every ethics 
whatsoever, there are certain sorts 
of facts about certain sorts of 
~ngs that are ultimate considera-
tions in determining what is moral-
ly good or bad, right or wrong, and 
the question now is: what sorts of 
things are such that certain facts 
about them are the final deter-
minants, directly or indirectly, of 
moral rightness or virtue?[3] 
Frankena is concerned with moral standing, 
while I am interested, more generally, in 
e~cal standing, whether moral, legal, pru-
dential, or whatever. Still, with that dif-
ference in mind, the way Frankena raises the 
issue is very useful: what are the ultimate 
considerations in determining what is justi-
fiable or not, and what beings manifest 
those? Every ethic begins somewhere, saying 
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that the objects of certain aims or certain 
pursuits themselves are justifiable to real-
ize or engage in and this is not due to their 
relation to some other justifiable aim or 
pursuit. These are the beginning points of 
justification in the ethic in question. At 
least, they are the beginning points, con-
flicts aside: the sources of what Ross con-
sidered prima facie duty and what conse-
quentialists might call a, but not necessari-
ly the, right or optimific act.[4] The char-
acterization of these beginning points would 
fill out the antecedents of the lOClst general 
norms of the ethic, ti10se hypothetical claims 
to the effect that if an aim or pursuit is of 
a certain sort, then it is justifiable, con-
flicts aside. These norms, in turn, would 
enter into the justification of other norms 
of the ethic (by what Paul Taylor calls "val-
idation" ) and into the justification of par-
ticular acts, either directly or tirrongh 
derived norms (by the process Taylor calls 
"verification"). [5] These ultimate consider-
ations, conflicts aside, I call "the seeds of 
justifiable conduct" in an etiUc. 
Different ethics identify different 
seeds, classical utilitarianism, for example, 
selecting pleasure and the absence of pain as 
the basis of what John Stuart Mill calls its 
"theory of life," while religiously oriented 
ethics, for example, select among various 
possible versions of enlightenment or beati-
tude. 
Once we know what the seeds of an ethic 
are, we can identify conditions or beings who 
do (or might) manifest those seeds, and then 
these will have standing or be considerable 
within ti1at ethic. That is, they will be 
conditions or beings whose presence, susten-
ance, and pursuits can be justified (con-
flicts aside) without reference to anytiUng 
else other than their manifesting (or perhaps 
being able to manifest) the seeds of justi-
Hable conduct. 
Questions of the justifiability of ani-
mal agriculture begin with questions of what 
are the seeds of justifiable conduct and in 
what are they manifested. Are they found 
only in beings within the domain of humans, 
or does their range extend beyond to nonhu-
mans as well? To assess animal agriculture, 
we first need to select among the various 
possible views of seeds and, in the bargain, 
among the various possibilities for assigning 
ethical standing. 
How might we make this selection? Some 
have thought that this question amounts to 
asking how might we find what the correct 
e~,ic counts as seeds of justifiable conduct 
and the possessors of ethical standing? [6] 
That view of the matter, however, rests upon 
a fundamental confusion. 
The problem should be familiar to philo-
sophers. In order to select the methcx:l ti1at 
will deliver the correct view of seeds of 
justifiable conduct (or in order to know that 
a methcx:l will fail to do so), we would have 
to have some way to attest to the reliability 
of the methcx:ls we select fran. This in turn 
re:IUires that we already have some grasp on 
what really are seeds in a correct etillc. 
Grasping the seeds of justifiable conduct, 
however, amounts to knowing the (basic) 
norms, and so, the ethic we seell:. Thus, to 
select a methcx:l to identify the correct ethic 
requires that we first have in hand the cor-
rect ethical theory. That, of course, is 
incoherent. Thus, it seems that nothing will 
satisfy getting at the correct etiUc. 
Picking between different conflicting 
views of seeds and who has standing is not to 
be taken as a matter of selecting the correct 
view of these matters. [7] It is not, then, a 
matter of discovery, of our learning what is 
really the case etiUcally and then suiting 
our beliefs about acceptable standards to the 
facts. What then is it? 
The only thing to say seems to be ti1at 
we decide what aims are seeds and what beings 
have standing. We simply must make up our 
mind without any pretense of meeting a test 
of truth or of satisfying an aim of accuracy. 
But what guide do we have for our decision? 
Is there any? Are these decisions just arbi-
trary, a matter of what feels right? Are 
they to be settled, then, by hurling ad hani-
nems such as "species chauvinist" or "crazy 
environmentalist"? As it turns out, there is 
at least one perspective on the selection of 
seeds which is alternative to searching for 
the correct ethic and which does not just 
abandon the problem to caprice. 
The suggestion comes fram Rudolf Car-
nap's radical Kantian approach to questions 
of what exists. [8] Carnap recognizes that if 
we stand outside of all commitments to what 
kinds of things might exist, and so outside 
of all standards or tests of what does exist, 
we have lOClVed outside all correct (or, as he 
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put it, "theoretical") answers to questions 
of what there is. From such a vantage fX)int, 
questions about what kinds of things there 
are should be viewed as external questions. 
These call for a decision not a discovery. 
And for Carnap, their decision is a "practic-
al" one, based wholly on what answer will 
most effectively and efficiently serve the 
purfX)ses of those asking what exists: pur-
fX)ses, e.g., of constructing a theory of the 
foundations of mathematics or of empirical 
science. 
A.pplied to our problem, this suggests 
the following. We have just seen that trying 
to find the ethically correct picture of 
seeds and that of the assignment of standing 
is incoherent. The proper determination of 
these matters is external to any specific 
ethic. The answers will provide us with 
norms of what is justifiable, conflicts 
aside, and of who or what has ethical signi-
ficance on its own merits. There is no cor-
rect answer to such puzzles, an answer in-
ternal to some view of what is justifiable 
and of who or what has intrinsic signifi-
cance. We need a decision, not a discovery. 
And following Carnap's radical Kantian lead, 
we would make the decision on the basis of 
what could serve well the purfX)ses for which 
we have ethical codes. We WGuld ask, how 
would seed aims and ethical standing be spe-
cified in a code llOst appropriate to the aims 
of anyone embracing any ethic. This, I shall 
call "the functionalist approach" to our 
problem. 
Should we follow Carnap's functionalist 
lead in deciding ufX)n an ethic to guide us in 
matters of animal agriculture? Yes. other-
wise, the ethic we select would be fX)intless, 
and so it would be unacceptable. Let me 
explain. To identify the fX)int of an ethic, 
as I understand that here, is to single out 
what it is about, the code that allows it to 
play a role making some difference to our 
lives and those of others, to have some func-
tion for some being. An ethic's fX)int is 
whatever makes possible its having some im-
pact ufX)n our lives, an impact that is attri-
butable to the ethic itself or to its opera-
tion. 
Now, whether an ethic has some point or 
not is quite important to being acceptable. 
If a code is acceptable, as oPfX)sed to unac-
ceptable, then its adoption is not arbitrary, 
not just something that would not matter at 
all. An ethic without fX)int, however, is one 
whose adoption would be arbitrary. Without 
point, an ethic would make no impact upon 
anyone. There would be nothing attributable 
to any impact that would make any difference 
to anyone and so might be counted in its 
favor or against it. Adopting it then, or 
not doing so, for that matter, would be arbi-
trary, and so the ethic would not be accept-
able as opposed to unacceptable. Thus, if an 
ethic is acceptable, then it has point. 
This result puts limits on what an ac-
ceptable ethic might say about seeds and 
standing. The problem from this functional-
ist perspective is not how to find what norms 
correspond to some ethical reality but, ra-
ther, to consider what we would need to count 
as seeds of an ethic, any ethic, if it is to 
have any impact at all upon us or others. A 
minimally acceptable ethic will have those 
features, including seeds, which allow it to 
function in some way such that it makes some 
differffi1ce to our lives or those of others. 
What might be the seeds of justifiable con-
duct and who or what might have standing in 
such a functional ethic? That is the problem 
we need to address. 
III: The Answer to the Problem 
My main contentions in this section are 
two: first, some ethics do have fX)int, and 
in fact, there is one characterization that 
fits any point that any ethic might have. 
Second, having this COIlIllOn feature does place 
restrictions upon what aims and pursuits are 
acceptably counted as seeds. As we shall 
see, these restrictions are quite general, 
but still extremely important here. As it 
turns out, they deny ethical standing to 
nonhuman animals, indeed, to any but ethical 
agents. 
To make gocxi these contentions, we need 
to begin with an account of the fX)int of any 
ethic. Kant, in the Foundations of the Meta-
physics of Morals, reminds us thatethics 
always have their impact through influencing 
choice and behavior by considerations appeal-
ing to reason and bearing on the justifiabil-
ity of our options. [9] The first main point 
of my argument is this Kantian one: if there
is ~ impact that is attributable to the 
operations of ~ code of ethics itself, then 
it is an im]?3.ct that the code has by direct-
~ choice and beha~ior through the applica-
tion of its norms to the options facing 
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agents, through ~ directing influence upon 
the aims ~~ pursuits of agent~ an influence 
11e code exerts by provid~ng Eeason~ pro and 
, Jntra the options open ~~ the agent. Let me 
refer to that claim as "the functionalist's 
principle." According to this principle, 
then, the most general impact of ethics is to 
facilitate the choice and pursuit of options 
by providing reasons marking aims and pur-
suits open to us as justifiable or not. 
This c:ontention seems so fundamental to 
all of ethical theory that it is difficult to 
know just how to argue best for it. Ethics, 
as Frankena puts it, are action guides, and 
how else might they serve in this capacity 
but t.hrough providing reasons for or against 
the various options facing agents. It mat-
ters not how we see the operations of these 
reasons, for example, in a cognitive way, as 
did Kant, of as emotively persuasive, in the 
various ways that C. L. Stevenson sketched 
for us.[lO] The conclusion is the same: 
ethics include, no matter what else, evalua-
tions more or less general in scope, [11] 
evaluations that provide reasons pro or con-
tra. And, if an ethic so understood is to 
have an impact, it must be the impact of the 
direction of reason upon an agent's aims and 
pursuits. The functionalist's principle re-
cords this point and, as such, seems uncon-
troversial. 
Perhaps, beyond relying on jus't that 
much, however, it would be wise to note an 
intolerable consequence of rejecting the 
functionalist's principle. Ethics are 
thought to have no point for very young in-
fants and for nonhuman animals. This is 
simply because their aims and pursuits are 
not open to the influence of justifying rea-
sons. Even Tom Regan, that most thorough 
champion of animal rights, grants this (as do 
Peter Singer and Bernard Rollin, for exam-
:)le). He notes that nonhumans are not etilic-
al agents and that the impact ethics would 
have on nonhumans must come through the in-
fluence of its justifying reasons upon ethic-
al agents. [12] But that is just to say that 
the point of ethics de]?E'.nds on their influ-
encing choice and behavior through such rec,-
sons. It is just to assert e1e functional-
ist I s principle. A rejection of that princi-
ple would leave open the question of whether 
ethics have point for young children and 
nonhuman animals. Since no serious party to 
the debate over animal agriculture seems to 
take that question as open, a rejection of 
that principle would be unacceptable. 
To say that the point of ethics is lost 
on youngsters and nonhuman animals, or that 
ethics are witl10ut point for them, is not to 
say that how they are treated does not matter 
ethically. [13] The next question, then, is 
what are we to conclude from the functional-
ist's principle? Might a being have ethical 
standing d.t'd ethics still be without point 
for it? Or is it that any being on which or 
whom ethics is lost lacks ethical standing 
and is important only because its welfare is 
tied up with the aims and pursuits of those 
for whom ethics do have point? 
Ethics that have point satisfy the func-
tionalist's principle, their impact oaning 
through an influence on aims and pursuits due 
to the justifying reasons of the ethics' 
norms. Clearly then, if an ethic is to in-
fluence choice and behavior through reasons, 
the influence will be exclusively on those 
whose choices and behavior can be directed by 
such reasons, namely, ethical agents. It 
will be the aims of those agents that are 
singled out as justifiable or not, the aims 
of those agents which the oode marks as ac-
ceptable or not. otherwise, the normative 
guidance would fallon deaf ears. 
Thus, aims 'identified as seeds by the 
ethic's basic norms will belong to ethical 
agents. They might be directed toward the 
well-being of non-ethical agents (as we shall 
. make much of later), but the direction of an 
aim is irrelevant to whether there is any 
point to marking it justifiable or not. Whe-
ther there is any such point depends on whe-
ther those aims belong to ethical agents. 
The fact that seeds in a oode are the aims of 
ethical agents is what allows that oode-
point. It is this that is necessary to its 
not being arbitrary. It is this that assures 
its, minimal acceptability. So, any ethic 
acceptable in ·so far as it has point will 
locate its seeas ~ng the aims ~~ ethical 
agents (those ~ to being <pided by the 
~tifying: reasons it provides). [14] Let me 
call that the "rationalist's principle." 
We have noted that the ethical agents of 
oodes with poin~ are restricted to the group 
of humans (thoGgh are not necessarily coex-
tensive with that group). Thus, the implica-
tion of the rationalist's principle is that 
the seeds of any ethic with point will be 
aims and pursuits of humans, as opposed to 
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nonhumans. [15] Since ethical standing be-
longs to whatever manifests the seeds of 
justifiable conduct, it is some hwnans and 
not other animals that exclusively enjoy such 
standing. Nonhuman animals, !:hen~ lack 
ethical significance on their own, at least 
in any ethic that might have any impact upon 
our lives or those of others. What signifi-
cance nonhuman interests and well-being have 
in !3uch an ethic is due !~ their being 00-
ject~ of the aims and pursuits of ethical 
agents. If these aims are seeds of justifi-
able conduct in an ethic, then, conflicts 
aside, they are justifiable to pursue without 
reg~ to other considerations. As objects 
of such aims, nonhuman animal welfare, free-
dom, and so one have a kind of fundamental 
importance. Still, this is an iIllflOrtance 
nonhumans have because of the standing of 
those ethical agents who are their champions. 
It is derivative upon the ~rnport:. of these 
human, as opposed to nonhuman, champions. 
This result I shall refer to as "the human-
istic restriction of ethical standing." 
IV: Amplification of the Answer 
Those with ethical standing are, then, 
among the group of humans. What, however, 
about the significance of nonhumans as com-
petitors in conflict with humans? What of 
the relative import of humans and nonhumans? 
The interests of nonhumans might end up 
more important than competing human interests 
in certain codes. This could happen in any 
ethic that allows nonhumanly directed airns as 
seeds and has a norm(s) of conflict resolu-
tion that allows such aims to win out over 
the competition. Do acceptable ethics oper-
ate this way? 
The answer is "yes," but to make good 
the point, we must say more about when ethic-
al codes are acceptable. All we have said 
thus far is that a code is acceptable only if 
it has some point. 
So far, so good, for surely an ethic 
that had nonhumanly interested aims as seeds 
and whose norm( s) of conflict resolution 
allc:JWErl such aims to win out over the compe-
tition would be an ethic with point. In 
particular, it would provide guidance on how 
to settle conflicts between such aims and 
ones that are humanly interested, guidance 
which could give highest marks to the nonhu-
manly directed aims in some circwnstances. 
While we are at it, however, we can say 
even more on behalf of this minimal animal 
lover's ethic. Notice that there is a second 
aspect to an ethic's being non-arbitrary. 
Adopting an ethic without point would be 
arbitrary, because there is nothing to say 
for or against adopting it as 0Pp?sed to no 
ethic at all. Another aspect of arbitrari-
ness can enter in when we choose between two 
or ~re ethics, all of which have point but 
which offer inconsistent guidance on the same 
matter. In this second way, adopting an 
ethic would be arbitrary if it restricted, 
for no reason, the seeds of justifiable con-
duct and the aims that can win conflicts. 
Adopting such restrictions would be biased 
and so question begging against those aims 
not counted as seeds or allowed to win a 
conflict. Only our minimal animal lover's 
ethic is not arbitrary in this second way. 
Clearly, we would beg the question un-
less we allowed nonhumanly directed aims the 
status of seeds of justifiable conduct. A£-
ter all, what could serve as a reason for 
ruling them out? Whatever could do the job 
would have to imply that excluding them is 
justified for some reason. As we saw above, 
however, no reasons can be given for saying 
that certain aims are or are not seeds. Such 
a claim is external to all ethics and itself 
constitutive of justifying reasons. Thus, 
denying seed status to nonhumanly directed 
aims would be without reason and so question 
begging. The animal interest advocate would 
reject it, and insisting upon it would be 
arbitrary, biasing the discussion in an unac-
ceptable way. 
The same can be said against an ethic 
whose basic norm(s) of conflict resolution 
would not allow nonhumanly interested aims to 
win out in conflicts with other aims. This 
norm(s) of conflict resolution is the funda-
mental ethical consideration that tells us 
which of two or more incompatible courses of 
action is justifiable. C?nsidering its role 
as an ultimate ethical consideration, there 
is nothing that would provide a justifying 
reason for such a norm, nothing whose asser-
tion or support does not already assume the 
acceptability of what that norm claims. 
Thus, if a basic standard of conflict resolu-
tion excludes certain aims from winning--for 
example, nonhumanly interested aims--it would 
be arbitrary or question begging, and so, 
unacceptable. 
The only conflict resolution principle 
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which would avoid this problem gives every 
=nflicting aim an equal chance at winning 
out over its canpetitors. It ac=rds as much 
importance to anyone aim as it does to every 
other competing aim, as much to nonhumanly 
directed aims as to exclusively humanly di-
rected aims. Now, if a principle is to ac-
=rd equal importance to every canpeting aim 
and yet resolve conflicts, it will proceed by 
urging whatever course of action will maxim-
ally allow for the pursuit of all airns af-
fected in the conflict situation. [16] If, 
for example, anirnals are needed for protein 
to such an extent that ra~s~ng them for 
slaughter and =nsumption would be what would 
,nax.iJnally facilitate the aims and pursuits of 
all those affected, animal lovers and not, 
then that would be the non-question begging 
way to settle the dispute. If not, then it 
would not be. 
What, then, about an ethic =unting 
nonhumanly interested aims as seeds of justi-
fiable conduct and allowing them to win out 
in conflicts with other aims? Only this 
minimal animal lover I s ethic will avoid arbi-
trariness on the two counts we have isolated. 
It will have point by providing guidance on 
issues where we need it, and only the guid-
ance it provides will be non-question begg-
ing. 
More than avoiding arbitrariness enters 
into the acceptability of an ethic. But we 
shall stop here, for now. This much should 
create a presumption in favor of this minimal 
animal lover's ethic and against alternatives 
to it. It is now time to apply this ethic to 
what we should say about =nflicts over rais-
ing animals for food and fiber. 
V: Applications of the Answer 
This question turns out to be an enor-
mously complex and pa.rtially factual inquiry. 
It amounts to this: just what treatment of 
nonhuman animals in agriculture will be such 
as to maximally serve the aims and pursuits 
of all those ethical agents affected by the 
conflict's out=rne. Confronted by such a 
problem, it would be silly to give the ap-
pearance of providing a final answer. I 
shall say, instead, only a bit, trying to 
make clear the complexity of some of the sub-
issues. 
Consider, first, sane of the charges 
that have been levelled against the proce-
dures used in animal agriculture. Perhaps 
the most notorious case is that of veal pro-
duction. Veal calves are generally kept in 
quarters that virtually eliminate all but 
some head movement and the freedom to lie 
down. Social =nduct is essentially pre-
cluded. Their diet is basically liquid. 
TI,eir environment is often dark. Their life 
is invariably short. The object of all this 
is to prenuce quickly al,d e=nom:i.c:ally a 
tendi=r meat product for a limited but =ntin-
uing market. The animal is treated just as d 
tissue factory whose concern to ~,e producer 
amounts to how 'Nell it perforras in putting on 
flesh in a short period of tiJne. 
All of this sounds diabolical, as though 
certain fanners have set out to contrive 
management practices that will ~1wart every 
natur.al striving of the animal incompatible 
with a higher profit. However, a closer look 
indicates that this view of the matter is, at 
best, only mostly correct. In the first 
place, most producers of veal would not even 
engage in the practice, regardless of 
procedures used, if the choice were up to 
them. Veal calves are mostly the male off-
spring of dairy cows, a progeny which is a 
problem to the dairy farmer. What is the 
farmer to do with such an animal? 
Asking the farmer to raise and keep the 
animals would be imposing a serious financial 
burden on them. Without further regulations, 
this is a burden they can be expected to try 
to externalize. Since the dairy industry is 
already heavily subsidized, however, it is 
hard to imagine what most farmers would be 
able to do besides just cheat and destroy 
immediately those animals that would have 
been raised for veal. 
Regulating the market so that only cer-
tifiable male dairy cow off-spring =uld be 
sold for slaughter as calves and req~iring 
that they be sold by the animal, rather than 
per pound, for an amount equal to expenses 
might well serve to renove all the incentive 
there is prese,tly for the use of intensive 
techniques. The practices described above 
are devoted to getting as much out of the 
animal as possible by selling it per pound in 
the shortest period (usually 2 to 3 months) • 
If there were no profit in such techniques, 
they would pass, assuming the critics are 
corcect about the veal producers' basic moti-
vation. Any scheme like this, however, would 
also have to require that the farmers keep 
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the animals healthy so that selling calves by 
the animal would not lead to neglect. Regu-
lations that would do all this would no doubt 
be expensive to ad-ninister and intrusive. 
Who would pick up the costs or put up with 
the intrusions? 
Perhaps, then, we should attempt to re-
educate tastes, thereby undermining the mar-
ket for veal? This, if effective, eventually 
would eliminate the unwanted intensive pro-
duction, all right. However, the fanner will 
still have the animals to contend with. 
Thus, in all likelihood, we would have traded 
those objectionable practices for the immedi-
ate disposal of animals that would have been 
raised for the veal market. 
What should we do, then, in the face of 
intensive veal production practices? I, like 
the so-called "animal lovers," find these 
practices objectionable, because, like them, 
some of my aims are directed toward not hann-
ing most other sentient creatures when this 
can be avoided at an ethically justifiable 
cost. Intensive veal production techniques 
seem to involve putting the animals in cir-
cumstances they would avoid if they could, 
and on this basis, the practices seem harmful 
to the animals considered as sentient crea-
tures with a life of their own. The loss of 
avoiding this hann would be monetary and 
gustatory, losses that are surely repairable 
and bearable, if we choose to repair and bear 
them. The protein of animals raised in these 
ways is not needed to maximally facilitate 
the aims and pursuits of all those in active 
conflict over the practices, let alone all 
those affected by the outcome of the con-
flict. One wonders what justification could 
be given for such practices if we appeal to 
an ethic that has point and is not question 
begging at the foundations? But, then, we 
just do not yet have all the facts, do we? 
Although there are differences in the 
animals, the management practices, and the 
market size, some of the same sorts of points 
can be made about the treabnent of brood 
sows. Unlike the veal calf, the brood saw is 
actively sought in order to function as a 
reproductive factory, which involves consi-
derable restraint in movement. Intensive hog 
raising practices, including saw restraint, 
mark a change over previous, more free-rang-
ing management techniques and were introduced 
in order to increase productivity and profit. 
Critics have urged that, at the least, these 
intensive practices are unjustifiable and 
ought to be eliminated. Some producers and 
production experts have defended them, often 
on a standard of animal welfare measuring 
only animal yield for profit. 
Clearly, hawever, we lack the facts to 
decide the issue using a defensible ethic 
such as the one outlined above. For example, 
what would be the impact on the industry 
structure if we were to remove the profit 
incentive supposedly fueling the engine of 
such practices? WOuld specialized producers 
be hurt the most and driven to take their 
capital elsewhere? Or would a larger sector 
of the farming ccmnunity be hurt, impairing, 
in the end, a source of food going far beyond 
pork and important to all of us? Perhaps we 
could get along just fine in the end with no 
more intensive hog production, letting those 
who have the taste pay more? Do we know? 
Jim Harter, Animals: 14~~ 
Copvright-Free-rrIUstra ~ons. 
New York: Dover, 19'79 
The question whether to make consumers 
pay for less intensive production techniques 
looms large also when we turn to the well-
known conditions of intensive egg and poultry 
production. In the face of the decline of 
the family farm, as well as the urban- and 
suburbanization of the populations of Western 
industrialized countries, the intensification 
of egg and poultry production has served to 
provide a stable and relatively inexpensive 
source of complete protein. What would be 
the cost of replacing those intensive manage-
ment techniques if we measured that price in 
terms of impainnent of the aims and pursuits 
of the ethical agents touched by t,he con-
flict? Again, I think that we do not have a 
good idea of what to say. 
That same question complicates the as-
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sessment of intensive production techniques 
in the case of beef. On the one hand, it 
,",ould be lOClst surprising if an acceptable 
~thic could justify the practice of grain-
'inishing cattle in intensive feed-lot situa-
ions. As Lappe p.Jints out, the grain could 
.,e used elsewhere, [17] or else the land used 
to produce it could be tUDled to other pro-
ducts that could be used elsewhere. The food 
produced without this grain would be every 
bit as good a source of protein and to some, 
every bit as palatable as that produced with 
it. Further, note that the beef produced 
non--intensively on open range in many areas 
of the United states and other countries, 
such as Australia, makes productive for the 
benefit of ethical agents land that would 
otherwise not be usefuL (The same is true 
for what is even a better use of such arid 
range, namely, sheep production for wool, 
lamb, and mutton.) Here, then, it seems that 
non-intensive techniques avoid indefensible 
waste while at the same time being productive 
for the overall benefit of ethical agents. 
On the other hand, however, if a world 
source of complete proteins is the main is-
sue, then intensive beef production, where 
economical and conducted without the \Yaste of 
grain finishing, is likely to turn out to be 
defensible. And, how could an assessment of 
animal agriculture ignore the fact that in 
much of the world, human malnutrition is due 
to a lack of available whole or complete 
proteins? 
Intensive beef production also might 
seem desirable in the face of social and 
environmental consequences of nonintensive 
beef production in areas of cheap lands and 
p.Jlarization of economic groups, areas such 
as are found in Central (and perhaps South) 
America. In those places, intensification of 
beef-raising might be able to accompany land 
reform that would leave the peasant agricul-
turalists better off econanically, and in 
some cases could provide the opp.Jrtunity to 
reduce environmental depredation. Again, 
however, the p.Jint to conclude with is that 
we just do not know about all of this. 
The full weight of our ignorance and the 
canplexity of the issues are made clear when 
we lOClve from the criticism of animal food and 
fiber production techniques to the ~ging of 
~anism. A serious review of any lOClve to 
veganism must assess the impact on the price 
and availability of vegetable protein sour-
ces, the balance of diets with respect to the 
arrount of usable protein in them, the chan-
nels of public information that would be 
needed in order to convert people's diets, 
the livelihood of those now making a living 
from the production of animal food and fiber, 
and the international relations centered on 
the production and distribution of animal 
food and fiber. 
With a consortium of experts, no doubt 
we could carry out these assessments. But 
surely, we are not yet in a p.Jsition to apply 
an acceptable ethical theory to the question 
of veganism. 
VI: Conclusion 
Agriculturalists and, lnore imp.Jrtantly, 
the legislat~rs, regulators, economists, and 
economic elite who control the plans of agri-
culturalists need guidance on what are ethic-
ally defensible practices (if there are any) 
of animal food and fiber production. Philo-
sophers can inform this guidance at its 
ethical base and by clarifying the epistemic 
and conceptual aspects of the basis. But we 
cannot do it all. As I have tried to illus-
trate, these questions lead us into enorrrous-
ly complex factual matters. .At least, this 
is so if our duties to animals are indirect. 
My arguments show that these duties are 
indirect. To deny this is to advocate an 
ethic without p.Jint or one question begging 
in its foundations. Let us not be so foolish 
or biased as to do either. And, let us not 
act as though operating alone, philosophers 
can settle questions requiring complex enpir-
ical inputs. In either event, we would be 
taking serious matters less than serious-
ly.[18] 
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